

Japan's Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan after September 11

Mark S. Cogan¹

Abstract

Japan responded to the September 11 attacks in the United States much like most American allies, delivering with immediate humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and deploying Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the Indian Ocean to help coordinate American-led military operations in Afghanistan. The reactive Japanese state, bound by internal and external pressures and a limited window of public tolerance for anti-terror operations was able to formulate a security sector reform policy in Afghanistan that fit existing human security and international development aid frameworks. Consequently, Tokyo was able to benefit from the prestige and increased status of international cooperation through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into Afghan society. This article documents Japan's significant contributions to peace and stability in Afghanistan as well as the political obstacles facing the country's DDR programme during the period between 2002 and 2006.

Keywords: Japan. Afghanistan, reintegration, DDR, peacebuilding, security policy

Introduction

At the end of the Cold War and the start of the American operation in the Persian Gulf, Japan found itself in a quandary. U.S. President George H.W. Bush requested that Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu deploy its Self Defense Forces (SDF), in addition to its regular financial contributions. Conflicted between the powerful domestic norms of pacifism and the international call of loyalty from its security benefactor, Japan ultimately flinched. Japan's indecision can be partially explained by its constitutional restrictions, as it relinquished the "right of belligerency" in Article 9 of its post-war constitution. The SDF, when viewed in the most rigid interpretation, are purposed solely

for the defense of Japanese soil as opposed to being assigned to multipurpose operations abroad. There were also differences in expectations as well as national security interests. While the Bush Administration expected Kaifu to join a multinational coalition led by the United States, Japan envisioned a force led by the United Nations, with unarmed civilians being deployed separate from the SDF. Both domestic and international pressures crippled Japan's decision making.

Kaifu agreed to dispatch civilian or SDF aircraft to evacuate refugees from the war. However, the aircraft never arrived and Japan became the target of international criticism. The Kuwaiti Government, in an act of public diplomacy, took out a full-page

¹ Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies Kansai Gaidai University, College of Foreign Studies Email: polisci03@gmail.com

Received: May 25, 2018 **Revised:** November 1, 2018 **Accepted:** Jan 20, 2019

advertisement in the *Washington Post*, praising 30 countries for their liberation. Japan was not one of them. International criticism spread beyond hesitancy to something deeper. Japan was billed as a *reactive* state (Calder, 1988), a second-rate middle power that espoused the rhetoric of a state that embraced its international commitments, but instead hid behind its tepid “checkbook diplomacy.” In a series of interviews with news organizations, former SDF officials, diplomats, and policymakers lamented Japanese indecisiveness. (Kelly & Kubo, 2015) Reeling from the sting of international rebuke by the United States, Japan soon began a period of reforms that would serve to rebrand its sullied foreign policy, from the deployment of military forces during times of international crisis, constitutional reforms that would embrace “proactive pacifism”, legislation that would permit the use of SDF forces in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO), to recommitting state resources around a UN-centric approach to international engagement.

The pursuit of international standing or recognition is common among states. This state behavior is has been classified by a number of interrelated concepts--status, prestige, honor and legitimacy Renshon (2017) defines status in international relations as the “standing or rank in a status community”. (p. 33) Status acknowledges the presence of desired attributes such as wealth, military capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout (Paul, Larsen, & Wohlforth, 2014, p. 7). In international politics, “the desire for social recognition is a potent and dynamic force determining social relations and institutions.” (Roucek, 1957, p. 310) Membership in international organizations, such as the United Nations is commonly associated with status attainment. Japan’s qualification for UN membership required

approval from the Security Council, which makes recommendations to the wider General Assembly.

International approval was dependent on the determination by other member states that Japan had cast off military ambitions and had become a “peace-loving” state. Japan’s UN elevation in 1956, suggests that status is collective, insofar as there is a general consensus as to Japan’s new national identity. Status has described as subjective and relative (Paul et al., 2014) as well as social, positional and perceptual (Renshon, 2017). While social and collective characteristics convey consensus about a state’s standing in the international community in relation to others in the community, the relative and positional nature of status is sometimes zero-sum. Japan’s UN membership granted it status equal to that of other members, with the exception of the 11 member states elected to the more prestigious Security Council. Despite the status pursuit, Japan has not become a so-called “normalized” state. It has been a member of the Security Council six times between 1956 and 1986 and eleven times since 2015, more than any other non-permanent member (KYODO, 2015). It also wanted to move beyond the mere middle power status that its growing economic power had afforded it.

Considering Japan’s decades-long search for higher status and prestige, this paper seeks to assess Japan’s contributions to international security through a review of primary and secondary sources. While Japan is constrained by normative limitations, its quest for status has resulted in some worthwhile contributions. Tokyo’s contribution to peacekeeping operations have been well documented, while operations outside the PKO sphere remain less comprehensive. To distinguish this paper from the existing body of literature, I have used status and prestige seeking as a lens in which to view Japan’s post-Persian Gulf War

contribution to international security. Japan's initial foray into security sector reform in Afghanistan beginning in 2002 provides a rich case study.

Afghanistan and DDR

Afghanistan is a landlocked country in central Asia, bordered by Pakistan in the south and Iran in the West. Decades of fighting and political unrest have made it one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world, ranking it 168th out of 189 countries in the UNDP 2017 Human Development Index. Afghanistan has been the victim of a number of armed conflicts since 1979, when Soviet-backed government exchanged fire with the anti-Communist Mujahideen. Factionalism within their ranks led to the Taliban, which had gained control over large parts of the country by the end of 2000. After the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the United States invaded Afghanistan and began a campaign against the Taliban regime. The Bonn Agreements in 2001 saw a new Provisional Government headed by Hamid Karzai. In the span of several years, especially between 2001 and 2006, the fledgling government made substantial progress, holding a national election for the office of the President, the National Assembly and provincial councils, the creation of the Afghan National Army, reformation of the Afghan National Police, the reintegration of more than two million refugees and internally displaced people, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of tens of thousands of former combatants. Essential to this progress was a group of key nations, including Japan, who have facilitated donor funding and influenced development activities. With the Taliban displaced from Kabul, the American coalition turned its attention to the reconstruction of the country through

peacebuilding and statebuilding programmes.

The United Nations outlines the DDR process as a method to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that post-conflict recovery and human development can begin (Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, 2014). In the modern era, soldiers after both World Wars were in various phases of demobilization, but with limited success (Banholzer, 2013). The unwinding of the German military machine failed as did large scale disarmament procedures via the League of Nations. The failure to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life caused some problems, however social development programmes such as the G.I. Bill in the United States eased the integration of military personnel back into greater American society. DDR began in the 1980s with the slow disarmament of guerrilla groups in Latin America, with the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). Later the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was tasked with "disarming and demobilization" of former combatants in the struggle with the Khmer Rouge. As of 2017, there were DDR processes in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Darfur (UNAMID), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Haiti (MINUJUSTH), Mali (MINUSMA), and South Sudan (UNMISS). Until Afghanistan, Japan had very little experience with DDR activities with the exception of some minor efforts in Africa which were well beyond its control.

The Shackles of Norm Constraints

Traditionally, the Japanese people have been rather uncooperative with more conservative, hawkish leaders who have sought a larger role for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Japan's post-war

constitution both include the renunciation of war as a “sovereign right of the nation” and “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” Yet, stung by the Gulf War debacle, Japan put forward the PKO Cooperation Bill in late 1991, giving authority for the country to put Japanese forces into the hands of the United Nations only. The International Peace Cooperation Bill, introduced to the Diet in September 1991, included the “Five Principles” for Japanese involvement in peacekeeping operations, (1) a ceasefire must have been reached between the conflict parties prior to a deployment; (2) the conflict parties have to give their consent to the deployment of the peacekeeping force and to Japanese participation in that force; (3) the peacekeeping force has to be completely impartial; (4) the Japanese government may withdraw its contingent if one of the criteria should not be satisfied anymore; and (5) the use of weapons be limited to the self-defense of Japanese soldiers. These decisions were inline with a broader goal of enhancing “Japan’s international standing, raising its political profile in international affairs, winning greater international respect for Japan as a nation that pulls its weight in international affairs”, which included winning a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. (George, 1993, p. 565)

Japan has placed special emphasis on its contributions to the United Nations and the international community, at one point becoming the top contributor of official development assistance (ODA) in 1989. While Japan’s economic output and substantive contributions to official development assistance (ODA) have only yielded modest gains, an ambiguous foreign policy and reactive approach to international commitments have limited Japan’s international profile. However, Japan has pursued various forms of status and prestige

through UN machinery. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was developed by the Japanese government in response to the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF), which was created by the General Assembly in 1991. TICAD was a part of Japan’s efforts to play a more proactive role in international affairs of the post-Cold War era, and in part, to atone for the international criticism that plagued its checkbook diplomacy. International response to TICAD diplomacy was overwhelmingly positive, as Japanese officials had remarked that Tokyo had achieved international recognition and that TICAD had become an important part of Japanese diplomacy in Africa.

Japan has actively pursued status in line with broader development objectives, such as engagement with North-South strategies in achieving some national Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With regard to foreign intervention, Japan has become much more active in the pursuit of status in order to achieve a more normalized role in international peace and security. As Former Foreign Minister Nakayama explained: “*Our Constitution, in its preamble, says that Japan ‘desires to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace’.*” (Singh, 2008) In that aim, Japan became a major contributor of official development assistance (ODA) since the early 1970s and by 1989, Japan overtook the United States as the largest donor, at \$8.97 billion. Economic recession reduced some of Japan’s efforts, but ODA is recovering as a pillar of Japanese cooperation. Peacekeeping initiatives account for a large majority, with Japan contributing almost 11 percent of the UN Peacekeeping budget.

While the Gulf War crisis did cause a severe crisis for Japan after its “checkbook” diplomacy failure, it has become much more

“proactively” engaged in security policy matters for a number of years. Japan sought the international spotlight in 1992 after engaging all three major parties to seek an end to Cambodia’s bloody civil war, and was able to help broker the Paris Agreements which eventually led to the creation of UNTAC. Japan wanted to play a key role in the new peacekeeping operation, UNTAC. These decisions were on target with a broader goal of enhancing “Japan’s international standing, raising its political profile in international affairs, winning greater international respect for Japan as a nation that pulls its weight in international affairs”, which included winning a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. (George, 1993, p. 565) There was a sense of urgency on the part of the Miyazawa government to push the PKO authorization forward, because of the timing of previous negotiations with various actors associated with the Cambodian peace process. Japan had worked since 1990 to play an active role in the negotiations, hosting the Tokyo Conference in June of 1990. (Takeda, 1998, p. 554) The Japanese were eager because the effort was to be led by a Japanese national, Yasushi Akashi, who was chosen to be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Cambodia. UNTAC, with a Japanese at the helm was also a unique form of peacekeeping, with a governance component that contained seven major divisions, including civil administration, civilian police, and rehabilitation. (Suzuki, 2017, p. 49) Japan contributed as many as 600 SDF personnel to UNTAC as a part of ceasefire monitoring and reconstruction, as well as 75 to civilian police and 23 to election monitoring. (Ibid.) While UNTAC did much to calm some fears of its Imperial past in Southeast Asia, only a more substantive contribution would soothe its toughest critics.

Security Sector Reform and DDR Analysis

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took immediate steps to directly assist the American-led “War on Terror” against Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and Taliban in Afghanistan. The timing was right. Public opinion and Japanese media were decidedly open-minded. Japan had lost more than 20 people in the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York. A *Japan Times* editorial acknowledged past reticence in taking action, but advised that “stamping out terrorist influences in Afghanistan required sustained efforts to bring peace and stability to a country long neglected by much of the rest of the world.” (*Japan Times* 2001) The editorial urged the Foreign Ministry to “play a positive role” in international efforts to bring peace to the region. Public opinion was supportive. The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, in a poll asked respondents if Japan should actively cooperate with the United States. Over 87 percent answered yes or to “some extent”. (Midford 2006, 21) While the public was not ready to commit combat troops, the decade of SDF participation in international peacekeeping had already sensitized the public to the task at hand. The Prime Minister knew that while Japan would “still be obliged to stop at red lights” (*Economist* 2001), an upswing in public and opposition support gave him the opportunity for a wider role for Japanese forces. Public opinion proved to be fickle, but Japan acted quickly before support could decline.

Japan faced both *gaiatsu* and internal pressure, but immediately after September 11, that pressure was muted. As Midford (2003) explained, the burden sharing pressure from the United States was not a factor after the September 11 terrorist attacks, nor was the kind of antagonism in Congress over Japan’s perceived “free ride”. Rather, American expectations about Japanese participation were negligible (334). American pressure was mounting in Tokyo, courtesy of Deputy U.S. Secretary of State

Richard Armitage, who advised the Japanese to “pull its head of out of the sand” and “show the flag” in the Afghan war. However, Midford (2003) describes this as “manufactured *gaiatsu*” where Japan “requests foreign pressure in order to give it an excuse to do what it wants to do anyway.” (336). While it is difficult to prove that the Armitage quote was artificial, the *Asia Times* reported in 2002, that Japanese high-ranking Navy officers took control over policy, advising American counterparts to urge the Bush Administration to increase pressure on Japan if brand-new Aegis vessels were to make their way into the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf (Berkofsky 2002). At home, the Liberal Democratic Party was reluctant to support a more robust response, but in the face of pressure, Japan’s national interests would be best served by “showing the flag” to placate American demands (Heginbotham & Samuels 2002). It can be argued that the manufactured *gaiatsu* worked. As Hughes (2007) noted, *gaiatsu* was effective because it “worked in combination with an amplified pre-existing Japanese sentiment which reviled the terrorist attacks on the US.” (p. 431)

There was an expectation among actors in the international community that Japan would contribute or play a leading role in concert with the United States and its partners. As far back as 2000, the idea of Japanese transformation into the “Great Britain of the Far East” (Hughes, 2007) was planted by the Americans into the hawkish egos of Japanese policymakers. Armitage, in a report for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, referred to Japan as the “Britain of the Far East”. These references would continue throughout the Afghanistan conflict and into Iraq. Japan’s subjective new status demanded responsibility. For example, the head of the UNHCR office in Pakistan expected Japan to play a leading role in minesweeping operations, while the United

Nations itself realized that the current PKO Law would be too restrictive in an environment where flexibility would be crucial (Ishizuka 2006). The Bush Administration praised Japan for intelligence sharing and providing emergency financial aid to Pakistan ten days after the 9/11 attacks, which was designed to support programmes that would relieve burden on the inflow of refugees, as well as boosting the stability of the Afghan government. Koizumi hoped that the donations to Pakistan as well as India would help recruit them as allies in the U.S. campaign against terror. In accordance with the 1992 PKO Law, SDF personnel were sent to provide blankets and materials for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In keeping with those higher status obligations, as well as sensing the opportunity for a more muscular position for the SDF, Japan amended the PKO Law in December 2001 to expand the scope of SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

To contribute to the mission in Afghanistan, Japan would have to go with the presence of GSDF forces, so leaders discussed alternative ways of contributing to the multinational force. Japan also has restrictions on the use of official development assistance (ODA), partly because the non-profit organization, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has kept a considerable distance from military related activities (Yasumoto, 2014, p. 34). In Afghanistan, security sector reform (SSR) was intended to build the capacity of the Afghan military and police to run security operations throughout the country, and when complete would allow for the slow withdrawal of international security forces.

Japan took the fifth pillar of the SSR process, which resulted from the Bonn Agreement, outlined at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (first Tokyo Conference) in 2002. Germany would take the lead role in creating and professionalizing the Afghan

National Police, the United States would be responsible for the Afghan National Army, judicial reform would be handled by Italy, counter narcotics by the UK and Japan was tasked with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). It is worth noting that the DDR programme was only generally mentioned by the Bonn Agreement vaguely, with calls for the extension of state security over militias and the establishment of a judicial reform commission. Critical to the five pillars was the capacity of the Government to hold free and fair elections in the country, but this could not have been accomplished without the disarmament of several of the combatant groups.

The Bonn Agreement spelled out several key timelines and shared responsibilities, but DDR was not among them partly because some members were worried about the idea of taking weapons out of the hands of the Mujahideen. An emergency Constitutional *loya jirga* (*grand assembly*) would be held as well as a series of benchmarks for the drafting of a new Constitution and free and fair Parliamentary and Presidential elections in late 2004 and 2005. Japan was not a part of the Bonn Agreement, and there was no mention of disarmament or reintegration in the negotiations or the final written agreement. DDR was not apparent in Afghanistan until 2003. When the Japanese government was given the politically sensitive responsibility of overseeing DDR, Afghan officials balked and maintained that the United States was best suited to the task (Rubin, in Sedra, 2003, p. 9). The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) was charged with the administration of the programme, while the majority of the financing was provided by the Japanese. Japan had claimed the prestige of two key aspects of Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Japan outlined the implementation of DDR in coordination with the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) and the

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Constitutional constraints and a pacifist public prevented Japan from assisting the United States in the counterterrorism operation known as Operation Enduring Freedom, but Japan cleverly enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) in October 2001 and promised to support as many as 40,000 American troops. It sent MSDF ships and ASDF transport vessels to provide non-combat support, including refueling ships (lasting until 2010), as well as search and rescue support. Japan revised its security role internationally, focusing on increasing its capacity and defending international security norms in alliance with the United States and spent as much as \$250 million supplying fuel and water to coalition forces (Ashizawa, 2014). Status played a role in the events leading up to Japan's participation. It was Germany, rather than Japan that hosted the first and most influential Afghanistan donor conference which was organized in Bonn in December 2001. Japan did not attend. Japan instead sought the influence of Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Envoy for Afghanistan in earning another shot at a donor conference in Tokyo in January 2002.

Japan's DDR involvement was a mixture of status pursuit and national identity shaped by pacifism and anti-militarism. For Japan to win the consolation prize of DDR after the Bonn and Tokyo Conference is not only noteworthy, but in some circles it was shocking. Japan clearly had some experience with DDR after the demobilization of more than five million of its own soldiers after World War II. Japan had limited multilateral experiences with DDR through the United Nations dating back to 1999, particularly in the African context of the reintegration of child soldiers into society. Japan was also faced with the prospect of pledging aid to a situation where it could not provide boots on the ground, a repeat of its traumatic

experience with the Persian Gulf conflict and where Tokyo failed to make a human contribution to a crisis of international peace and security (Yasumoto, 2014, p. 35).

In May of 2002, Tokyo introduced a plan to establish a demobilization agency in the capital of Kabul, which would serve as a mechanism for the implementation of demobilization and reintegration programmes by international organizations and their implementing partners. However, the plan was never approved and the agency was later dissolved. Instead, the responsibility for the reintegration and demobilization process was given to the UNAMA. Some components of the agency proposal took the form of the Afghan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADDRP), which was aimed to demobilize 20,000 over the period of a year, but again, this program never materialized (Sedra, 2003). Later, Japan would place DDR under the human security track of the Consolidation of Peace Program (COP). DDR also had little in the way of uniqueness. Because of the scope and scale of the challenges in implementing a disarmament programme in the country, DDR in Afghanistan copied from other areas, such as Sierra Leone. Without the status that accompanies the implementation of such a large and cumbersome programme, Japan attracted its fair share of criticism for the perceived lack of a long-term plan for DDR.

The process of DDR can be a sequential one, where each stage of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration stages have a clearly defined beginning and end. The reality however, is that there is often a detachment of each of the segments of the process, with a DD and the R removed or reassigned to different aspects of a peacebuilding mission. Japan also had its share of organization within the DDR process. The “R” component, or reintegration was removed or assigned into the human

security track. Reintegration involved the training and reabsorption of former fighters into the civilian workforce rather than the actually disarming or demobilizing soldiers (Yasutomo, 2014, p. 40). Japanese efforts in DDR started in a disorganized fashion. According to Rossi & Giustozzi (2006) the DDR process was debated and there was very little interest in the process by the United States, which began a period of infighting between American and ANBP personnel. Japan proposed the idea of moving past the first “D”, moving on to the demobilization and reintegration phases of the operation, but eventually relented to the American position that disarmament had to come first.

Japan’s leadership did steer the process to a 2003 Tokyo Conference which was attended by more than 30 donor countries, including the United States, the European Union and several international organizations. With direction from Japan, the United Nations became the primary implementing agency for the DDR process through a new mechanism, the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) which was established by UNDP. The goal was to “*decommission formations and units up to a total of 100,000 officers and soldiers and in the process to collect, store and deactivate weapons currently in their possession in order to be able to reconstruct the Afghan National Army (ANA) and return those not required to civilian life.*” (Sedra, 2002, p. 3). The proposed 100,000 soldier reduction was a compromise proposal between the Government of Afghanistan and the UNAMA, as one party believed the total to be as high as 250,000 or as low as 50,000 in the case of the United Nations. The ANBP later lowered the target to 60,000, as many on the payroll of the Defence Ministry were merely ghosts, a phantom figure indicative of high levels of corruption within Afghan line ministries (Sedra 2003).

Results, Observations and Conclusions

Japan made a considerable contribution to security sector reform in Afghanistan, however it is unlikely that the security situation improved. SSR reform has been marred by a number of local ownerships by the Government of Afghanistan as well as some donor countries which were dictating terms and controlling the SSR agenda (Sky, 2006). Regardless, by mid-2006, the Japan-led DDR programme disarmed close to 60,000 ex-combatants and seized 150,000 light weapons and more than 100,000 heavy weapons. DDR in Afghanistan did yield some significant results, although many of them were marred by political interference or backsliding on the part of some programme participants. At the end of the first stage of the DDR process, some 120,000 former Taliban combatants refused to be demobilized and continued through illegal armed groups. The primary challenge to DDR in Afghanistan was a lack of political will by the government and local power brokers (*warlords*), as the Ministry of Defense resisted demobilization and former combatants were hesitant to relinquish arms. Because of these issues, UNDP created a new programme called the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), in 2005 under the ANBP. Japan was a critical financier of the programme, providing \$35 million to create employment opportunities for former militia members (Ashizawa, 2014, p. 5).

As summarized above, Japan's prestige building in terms of its ability to organize large-scale donor conferences, engage in a wide range of diplomatic activities has paid dividends for Afghanistan. Tokyo was able to host key international conferences to organize the reconstruction of the country and coordinate international organizations on the implementation of Japanese aid. Afghanistan would also serve as the first time where Japan would serve as

the lead donor country as well as serve in a lead capacity for an SSR programme, a first for Tokyo that had little to no experience in the sector. Japan was careful not to expose its SDF to the dangers of combat or exposure to violence, due to normative constraints. Its involvement in Afghanistan was limited to mainly financial contributions, to which it was the leading financier, as well as to only civilian deployments. There was a strong consensus to keep the SDF completely out of Afghanistan to be consistent with Japan's restrictions on using force or endangering the lives of soldiers or its civilian nationals (Hein, 2011). These restrictions were consistent with past posturing in Cambodia, when two nationals were killed outside proximity to its SDF. Japan has always been reluctant to expose its nationals to violence, and the prospect of it dramatically decreases public support for peacekeeping or other related operations.

Some have suggested (Sedra, 2003) that the SSR process was less infused with coherence and more elements of frustration as a result of the lead-nation format. (p. 258) Some suggested (Sky, 2006) that Western nations, including Japan were seeking to infuse Afghanistan with a Western liberal system without considering the circumstances or traditions of the country. (p. 24) Little attention was paid to Afghan ownership of the process outside the management of middle range commanders who sought to maximize graft opportunities through the DDR chain.

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